Why Why the German Republic Fell is Hard to Find

Bruno Heilig’s 1938 essay Why the German Republic Fell is posted and freely available on the Internet. Unfortunately, the Scholars at the School of Cooperative Individualism are not the world’s greatest proofreaders, so google has some trouble finding it, but it is here.  There is also a nice abridgement here.  Hardcopy, of course, is for sale cheap at Schalkenbach.

I read this booklet about 25 years ago, didn’t remember a thing about it, but hoped it would give me some insight into how the Weimar inflation was dealt with. No such luck, it really begins after inflation had been tamed and prosperity commenced, but it’s all the more worthwhile for that.   Heilig asserts that the rise of Hitler was caused by land speculation. I am no expert in German history, but he does seem to make a good case.

Not by land speculation exclusively, of course, but land speculation as an ingredient along with:

  • public aid to large landlords, encouraging them to withhold land from use
  • privatization, on especially favorable terms to connected individuals and groups
  • failure to fully utilize farmland, resulting in unemployment as well as high food prices
  • tariffs, raising prices of consumer and industrial goods
  • public subsidies to favored enterprises
  • control of the major news media by the landed class

Land prices soared, wages fell, eventually the economy slowed, and:

Although it was obvious that the, “invariable costs” — i.e. the tribute land monopoly exacts from the working people — were eating into all production, the responsible men and the leading exponents of what was taught as economics kept their eyes, as if under some hypnotic influence, fixed upon the worker’s pay-packet.

Reformers advocated unworkable or ineffective solutions: If progress brings poverty, they urged that we retard progress.

The newspapers, of course, served the interests of their owners:

I need not explain what that propaganda organization meant in operation. Its effect was to sway public opinion into believing that the interests of the landowners were the interests of the nation. Subsidizing the landlords was the accepted policy for preserving and even saving the sources of subsistence of the people: the higher tariff walls were for the benefit of the wage-earning population: increase in land values meant increase in the national wealth: and so on…

[A]s unemployment grew, and with it poverty and the fear of poverty, so grew the influence of the Nazi Party, which was making its lavish promises to the frustrated and its violent appeal to the revenges of a populace aware of its wrongs but condemned to hear only a malignant and distorted explanation of them.

Much in this essay is similar to today, tho Heilig never uses words like “TIF” or “terrorism.”  Some things are decidely different, for example I don’t think Germany at the time had anything like a well-paid public employee class, nor a large class of small-scale investors, such as workers with 401k’s.  But it’s easy to see how today’s conditions could lead to similar results.

The wrong way to estimate land value

I do appreciate that our wealthy colleagues at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy have compiled and published estimates of residential land value for states and major metropolitan areas. I just wish they had been more careful.

Geoists are often challenged to demonstrate that it’s feasible to estimate land value.  It’s a fair question, and we have good responses. Assessor Ted Gwartney wrote an accessible paper on the subject, as did Alex Anas and William Vickery (neither on the ‘net, afaik, but if anyone asks I will try to dig up the cites). There are several valid approaches, depending on the specific situation.  For instance, in an area with many teardowns, the value of land is the purchase price of the teardown parcel, plus the cost of demolition. Other methods are used where there’s more vacant land, or new development is taking place, or land is being condemned for public purposes, or land ground leasing is common, etc.  Once you have values for a few parcels, you estimate the remainder by comparing their size, location, and other characteristics to those you have good numbers for.

Lincoln’s estimates illustrate why it’s wrong to estimate land value by subtracting depreciated improvement value from total parcel value. They have undertaken to estimate the land and improvement value for the average single family home in each state, for each calendar quarter since 1975, most recently for the first quarter of 2009.  And they did it by subtracting depreciated improvement value from total value.  Thus they find that the average house in Illinois sits on a lot worth $12,480,  compared to $23,260 in South Dakota. Montana’s average is $69,949, Arizona’s $90,040.  These numbers simply make no sense.

Their MSA estimates are a bit less bizarre, but don’t seem consistent with the state-level estimates.  One reason may be that for the metro’s they could use American Housing Survey information.

It is good that somebody is trying to estimate some portion of land value.  It would be even better if it were done reasonably well.

Lincoln are also starting to compile some comprehensive information on how and how much the ownership of property is taxed in the various states. So far the information seems quite limited, but eventually, if carefully done, it may be exceedingly useful.

btw, with this post I am initiating a new category, “dependent scholars.”  This is to distinguish the employees and grantees of Lincoln (and many many other institutions) from actual independent scholars.