Archive for the ‘taxes’ Category

Land value impacts of Minneapolis light rail

image credit: Steven Vance via Flickr (cc)

In 2010, the University of Minnesota’s Transitway Impacts Research Program released two studies of the impact of the Minneapolis light rail (“Hiawatha Line”) on real estate values. The residential study (pdf) estimated that houses near rail stations gained a total of $29.4 million more than houses outside the area, and multi-family properties gained a total of $17.7 million.  The  commercial/industrial study (pdf) estimates an increase of $20 per square foot (pdf) of building space, tho they do not extrapolate this to estimate the total impact.  Assuming for the moment that the commercial/industrial impact (which includes much of downtown Minneapolis) is double the total residential impact, we have a total land value gain of $141 million.

Now, that’s a nice amount of money, but building and equipping the rail line cost $715 million in total tax money, and it seems per page 32 of this big pdf to require about $15 million in annual operating subsidy from taxes.  Assuming the construction cost to be financed with bonds costing 4%, that’s an annual cost of about $44 million (in addition to fares collected.)  Can this be justified by a land value increase of $141 million?

It’s a question worth asking, but there are reasons the answer may be “yes, easily.” First, a big shortcoming of the studies is that they compare prices before the line started operating, in 2004, with prices afterwards.  It stands to reason, and has been established elsewhere, that real estate values start rising no later than the beginning of construction for a new rail transit line.

Second, real estate sales price may be the capitalized value of future expected net rent, after taxes, but is only indirectly related to gross rent.  The difference is taxes, not only the real estate taxes collected against the parcel, but also other taxes which operate to reduce rent.  Thus, increased real estate tax, sales tax, state income tax, and other taxes which may occur as a result of the transit line should be recognized as a benefit which the community receives (and collects!).

Finally, the studies look only at the localized effects within a mile of the station. Of course the greatest concentration of benefits will be found in this area, but a small percentage value increase regionwide, which could result from the rail line, could sum to a large amount but would not show up in these studies.

In conclusion, it is certainly possible that the community benefit of the Hiawatha Line, as measured by actual land value, far exceeds the cost of building and operating the  facility. Unfortunately, these studies do not actually test the proposition.

None of this is to say that transit investment always increase land value.  A project whose main purpose is to provide jobs and contracts, with little transportation benefit, might cost far more than the resulting increase in land values (if any).

Thanks to Bill Batt for the lead to these studies.

How much is land value, really?

A relevant query from Mohamad Tarifi showed up on the Facebook LVT group:

photo credit: Zoomar via flickr (cc)

A surprising lesson I learned from helping a family member shop for a house in the US: most property value is in the improvement (building) not the land. For example, in a 1M$ house only 100k-200k is land (and this is south california where land is supposed to be super expensive). Since I am new to all of this can someone please explain to me why this does not significantly weaken the LVT argument?
He doesn’t tell us which part of Southern California this is; nowadays there are plenty of places where land (and houses) are worth little.  But even in prosperous times, builders of new houses typically expect the land to cost maybe 20% of the selling price for a new house, so his figure is plausible for some areas. But a new house isn’t the average house.
Routinely, in any dynamic community, houses (as well as other buildings) are demolished from time to time so the land can be re-used. When this happens, it means the land with the house on it was worth less than the bare land.  The average house is somewhere along the path from “land value is 20% of total” to “land value is over 100% of total.”
The existing U S personal and corporate income tax cause an additional bias to underestimate land value.  The owner of “income property” can deduct an amount from her taxable income based on the “depreciation” of the improvement, but land cannot be depreciated.  And, since the U S Government has little idea what the selling price of land actually is, it is a simple matter for the “taxpayer” to overestimate the proportion of real estate purchase price which is for the improvement.

Taiwan monitors land value

Shin Kong Life Tower

photo of Shin Kong Life Tower from Wikimedia

Much like Korea, Japan, and other advanced countries, Taiwan has a land value tax which requires it to monitor land value regularly.  And they do, apparently pretty well, as indicated by this report that 2011 land values average 8.65% over the previous year. The land value tax could be one of the reasons Taiwan seems to be more prosperous than most countries, but that isn’t my point.

My point is that assessing land value is not exceedingly difficult, if one has competent and reasonably honest assessors.  The most valuable land in Taiwan is reportedly under the Shin Kong Life Tower, NT$1.21 million per square meter (about $4,000 per square foot, a figure probably never seen in Chicago).

Thanks to the Facebook LVT group for the link.

Secret to adequate transit funding in half a sentence

 

New York image credit: Mo Riza via flickr (cc)

New York image credit: Mo Riza via flickr (cc)

 

Hong Kong image credit: theloneconspirator via flickr (cc)

Hong Kong image credit: theloneconspirator via flickr (cc)

New York’s transit system, like those here on the U S mainland, finds itself in a financially unsustainable position.  Despite huge subsidies from taxation of productive activity, its managers claim a need for $10 billion additional capital funds, and the current year’s budget assumes a docile union as well as $35 million that appears imaginary.

And, like private-sector corporate managers, its chief has departed the troubled system for triple the compensation at a more prosperous organization, in this case the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway.  Would you blame him?

For those of us who seek reliable transit funding from a source which does not burden productivity, the important point is what this relocated executive calls Hong Kong’s “sustainable financial model.”  And what is that? Simple, and no surprise to those who have been paying attention here.  The Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway Corporation “earns millions of dollars from real estate developments along its rail lines.”  That’s all it takes.  Collect some of the land value, which public transportation supports, to fund the operation at reasonable fares. [Oh, yeah, and get competent managers for the transit operation, but they don't mention that here.]

Source: Former M.T.A. Chief Recounts His Ups and the System’s Downs, New York Times, by Michael M. Grynbaum, Jan 4 2012.  Thanks to Metro Magazine for the link.

Another entrepreneur brought down by bad public finance

Cocoa Pods

Cocoa Pods, by sarahemcc via Flickr (cc)

This one was “Bernard Callebaut, Alberta’s most famous chocolatier,” who purchased land to build a new chocolate factory.  Those who understand land rent and the business cycle won’t be too surprised at what AlbertaVenture.com tells us happened next:

[Callebaut] insists that it was an ill-timed decision to buy a large plot of land near the Petro-Canada station on the TransCanada Highway just west of Highway 22 for $5 million, and his bank’s unwillingness to exercise patience, that really did him in. “The idea was we would sell 30 acres for development, and we would keep the back part, which is actually the less-expensive part,” Callebaut says. He planned to build a manufacturing and warehousing facility there, and he even held out hope that the project would serve as a tourist attraction. “People love to see chocolate factories,” he says.That never happened. Instead, the value of the land plummeted, and his bank decided to pull the plug.

Of course, under the current system of public finance he really had no choice. He needed land for his factory.  If he rents instead of buying he is hostage to the landowners.  Only if he really understood how the land cycle works, possibly he could have prospered.  But no, Bernard Callebaut is not a political economist,  he is a chocolatier.  But perhaps he might have benefited from a learning some of what we teach at the Henry George School.

Like most good stories, there’s more to it than that.  He not only lost his land and his company, he lost his name.  To his lawyer.  Read it here.

Another successful politician endorses land value tax

Nick Boles

image from Financial Times

Nick Boles

MP for Grantham and Stamford. New-intake MP and a key moderniser. Former Policy Exchange director and one of the Notting Hill set. Deemed close to the leadership. Tipped for bigger things

I assume this means he’s successful, British political terminology being rather unfamiliar to me. What’s really important is that

Nick Boles, The MP for Grantham and Stamford says a Land Value Tax should be introduced and use the proceeds to cut National Insurance – permanently.

He doesn’t want to do it exactly how I would want to do it, because he seems to want to exclude owner-occupied residential land and farmland, without limitation.  But the important thing is, he’s a successful politician, he gets elected, and he appears to want to move toward a sound economy. I’m just some guy with a blog.

I also don’t know how all this relates to the British custom of building homes on rented land far more commonly than Americans do. But it seems to be his top priority.

Source: FT via GN

Outrageous assessments

3710 N. Kenmore

Image of 3710 N. Kenmore from Cook County Assessor

Gary Lucido writes of a small parcel at 3710 N. Kenmore, offered at $9.9 million ($4950/sq ft) after failing to sell when offered at lower prices. While the price seems outrageous, the property is very close to Wrigley Field and could be used for a billboard or rooftop viewing platform. We know that the former use has commanded $350,000/year on a nearby building, which seems to justify a multi-million-dollar asking price.

So we have a parcel worth, let us say, five million dollars.  What are the taxes? (more…)

Karl Marx at the Tea Party

K Marx

photo credit: jtriefn via flickr (cc)

As the national debt finds its support in the public revenue, which must cover the yearly payments for interest, etc., the modern system of taxation was the necessary complement of the system of national loans. The loans enable the government to meet extraordinary expenses, without the tax-payers feeling it immediately, but they necessitate, as a consequence, increased taxes. On the other hand, the raising of taxation caused by the accumulation of debts contracted one after another, compels the government always to have recourse to new loans for new extraordinary expenses. Modern fiscality, whose pivot is formed by taxes on the most necessary means of subsistence (thereby increasing their price), thus contains within itself the germ of automatic progression. Over-taxation is not an incident, but rather a principle. In Holland, therefore, where this system was first inaugurated, the great patriot, De Witt, has in his “Maxims” extolled it as the best system for making the wage-labourer submissive, frugal, industrious, and overburdened with labour. The destructive influence that it exercises on the condition of the wage-labourer concerns us less however, here, than the forcible expropriation, resulting from it, of peasants, artisans, and in a word, all elements of the lower middle-class.

– K Marx, Capital, Part VIII Chapter XXXI (source)

So Karl objects to public debts, sees them requiring high taxes as a way to keep the workers docile and the lower middle-class poor. What part of this do the Tea-Partiers disagree with?

Did you hear the one about the two economists….

…who spoke for over an hour about cities, development, migration, and density, and asserted that America would be more productive if our cities were denser, and did not mention economic rent nor land value?

They did it here, on econ-talk, and you can download the podcast or just read a pretty good text summary (I do not recall them using the word “land” either, but it appears several times in the text summary so I must have missed it). The book itself seems to be available only on Amazon Kindle, which as I understand it means I cannot buy it, but only license a copy to read. But from the interview I gather that author Ryan Avent has determined that American cities (and some suburbs too) are not as densely developed as they “should” be, and that this is due to local governments’ reluctance to allow development at optimal densities.

Now certainly there’s no question that local governments, usually reacting to neighborhood concerns, often refuse to allow development at densities which are physically workable. I recall one suburb where a proposal would have had single-family houses on lots of 9000 square feet.  Community reaction was that the kind of people who would live on such small lots would not be desirable neighbors, even tho in many other cities such a lot would be considered oversize.  These concerns are often stated as “property value” arguments, and perhaps they really are.  That’s an expected consequence of an economic system where ordinary people cannot expect to accumulate much money by working and saving, and must hope to profit from rising prices of the real estate they occupy.

And it’s not unknown for the politicians whose approval is needed for major developments to take advantage of the opportunity for personal gain, legal or otherwise but surely wrong.

So how is it to be decided what the optimal density is? In  Science of Political Economy, Henry George observes that, for each kind of production, there is an optimal density at which to work.  That density depends on what is being produced, the technology applied, the number of workers available, their skills, the quantity to be produced, etc., so it will change over time.  Avent may be correct that we would be better off if higher densities were permitted in some already-dense desirable places, but he certainly didn’t offer much evidence in this podcast.

But let us assume that higher density would be a good thing (and I am certain that in some places it would be), how is it to be achieved? Avent seems to assume that a reduction in land use regulation would be the proper method, because the market is efficient and so density would rise to the appropriate level.

But communities are more complicated than that, and you can’t, or at least shouldn’t, ignore externalities.  The first builder to put a high-rise in a desirable townhouse neighborhood may profit nicely.  However, not only does the character of the community start to change, but different infrastructure is needed.  Can the streets handle the traffic, or can acceptable public transport be provided? Will the sewer and water system handle the load? What are the other effects on the larger community, and how can they be dealt with? There are loads of reasons why it makes sense for the community, acting thru its local government, to have a major say in its development.

But to really irritate those who understand political economy, Avent says:

[I]f you had a sort of density charge–I hate to tax density in that way but in terms of being realistic about the distribution of cost–you could channel some of that into investing in local amenities: could be parks, could be transit, something to try to convince local stake-holders that density is going to be in their interest. So normally we think of taxes as discouraging an activity–which it would. It would make it more expensive for developers to make urban areas more dense.

Yes, some way for the community to share in the benefits of increased density. Can you say “land value tax?” It doesn’t tax development, it taxes development potential.  It pressures landowners to build at appropriate densities, but doesn’t punish them for doing so. Supported by competent and realistic zoning, it guides density to the places where is works.

Somebody told me once that the Economist, for which Avent is a correspondent, is a pretty good source of economic news except that it refuses to acknowledge the possibility, let alone the benefits, of a land value tax. I still haven’t seen anything that contradicts this assertion.

The Wealth Defense Industry

Wonderful phrase; wish I had thought of it.  It’s Jeffrey Winters’ term for the pile of lawyers and others who contrive technically-legal ways for wealthy people to avoid paying most of the tax for which they would otherwise be liable. His recent book, Oligarchy, seems to have a lot of other details we haven’t seen elsewhere.

All I actually know about Winters and his work comes from this interview, broadcast this afternoon on WBEZ. I did note one error: The U S federal income tax imposed in 1894 was the second, not the first, which was in  1861. He seems to have compiled a lot of data that we don’t usually see (some of it presented in this pdf article).  Naturally, altho his work is descriptive, he is asked about the potential for the Occupants or other movements to alleviate the oligarchs’ control.  One wishes that he had mentioned the importance of taxing privilege, instead of production. Perhaps he is unfamiliar with the concept.

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