Archive for the ‘Georgist teaching resources’ Category

Are tariffs even more regressive than I thought?

Tariffs– fees charged by the U S Government for the import of goods– are designed to protect politically-powerful interests who would otherwise be unable to compete as profitably with foreign producers.  So they are regressive in the sense that politically-powerful interests are likely to be relatively wealthy.

But according to this article, tariffs are also regressive in the sense that their direct impact on the poor exceeds that on the wealthy. “Luxury goods have very low tariffs, while cheap clothes, underwear, shoes and household products have much higher rates.”  Several examples are cited; I have no idea whether they’re typical.  Both the Cato Institute and the Democratic Leadership Council are quoted in support, an official of the former calling tariffs “our most regressive tax that the federal government imposes.”

A percentage of a lot is quite a bit

Here are a couple more examples of troubles we wouldn’t have under a just economic system.

Mortgage servicers incentivized to prevent mortgage modification. Many commentators have pointed out that, if the value of a property declines below the market value, and the homeowner is unable to pay, the lender is better off agreeing to reduce the principal to an amount consistent with current values.  (This is true even in the absence of any government-funded incentives.) So why does it rarely happen? It’s because lenders, apparently to conform to bizarre federal tax rules, have given up the right to modify loans.  Only the mortgage servicer, an independent company (tho sometimes a subsidiary of a big bank),  has the right to do that.  But the mortgage servicer is paid based on a percentage of the outstanding principal, thus has no incentive to help reduce it.  (Cash incentives offered under a recent federal program apparently aren’t large enough to matter.)

The geoist perspective: If land values were fully taxed,  real estate prices never would have bubbled, and mortgages would cover only the cost of the house, not the cost of the land it occupies.  Therefore mortgages would be smaller, perhaps rarer, and the whole problem of numerous underwater homeowners could never have occurred.

A little extra sleaze for municipal bonds. When a municipality (or, for that matter, any organization) issues bonds, they choose an underwriter who, for a fee, agrees to get all the bonds sold.  The issuer may choose the underwriter by open bid or by negotiation.  Academic research shows that, in the latter case, interest rates tend to be 17 to 48 basis points (hundredths of a percent) higher.  So how were 85% of the $378 billion in municipal bounds issued last year underwritten? By negotiation, which seems in theory to be costing taxpayers several billion dollars over the life of these bonds.   And that 85% includes 100% of bonds issues by the City of Chicago.  No one familiar with local government will be surprised at the reason: “[T]he city and its aldermen want to reward those who support public officials and politically connected charities.”

The geoist perspective: Most public debts are issued to benefit the underwriters and bond purchasers. At best, the funds are used for improvements that increase land values. Therefore, capital investments should be paid thru a tax on land values. If the landowner who benefits hasn’t enough cash to pay her share, she may need to borrow privately to cover it, but the general public should not be liable. If the improvement does not increase land rents enough to justify its cost, then it is not worth doing.

Much more information about both of these outrages is provided in the source articles, which you should read unless it would make your head explode.

Taxing billboards– a win-win?

Since billboard value is a function of location in the community, it’s only fair that the community should collect most of the rental value.  Accordingly, the City of Toronto expects to collect C$10.4 million/year with a tax of $850/$24,000 per billboard, “depending on size and type.” Naturally, the billboarders object, saying that they’ll pass the tax on to landowners and advertisers (which somehow makes it illegal– but I do not understand U. S. law, let alone Canadian).  But of course, all taxes are ultimately paid by landowners. Perhaps the tax will reduce the number of billboards, but most citizens are likely to survive this loss.

Mayor Daley, being in a taxing mood, might want to consider this, if his obligations to the billboarders aren’t excessive. Chicago Reporter has found many illegal billboards in the city, and that politicians receive, not only free space, but cash contributions, from the billboarders.

ht Frank Dejong

Inequality vs. economic growth

Henry George notes that existence of privileged classes tends to reduce economic growth, because the rich must spend nonproductive effort stealing from the poor and protecting their gains, while the poor spend nonproductive effort trying to defend themselves.  And he noted that a large part of the labor force will comprise “idlers and those who minister to them.”

Something approximating the former category has recently been termed “guard labor” and some work has been done toward measuring it.  A comparison of U S states indicates that the proportion is higher where inequality is greater.  Cross-national comparison shows some correlation to polarization and political conflict.  A proposal is even made for something like a “citizens dividend,” tho the funding source isn’t identified.  Also, NYT column about costs of inequality here.

HT to Max Keiser (video).

Housing cost trends around the world

A great little interactive tool compares house price trends to income trends and general price levels for twenty countries. Be warned that it is flash-based.  Most series seem to go back to 1990.  Relative to incomes, Holland and Belgium show the greatest increases, while the big decliner was Japan.  Thanks to Steve Keen for finding it and providing the link, originally from The Economist. And of course we know that house prices mainly represent the cost of land (including the cost of permission to build).

Review of Lincoln’s new “LVT” book

LAND VALUE TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE
edited by Richard F. Dye and Richard W. England
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2009

“[E]conomists agree on a great many things, but tend only to discuss the things about which they disagree,” writes Lincoln Institute (of Land Policy) chief Gregory K. Ingram in the Foreword to this new book.  And if one is disinclined to conspiracy theory, that might be the reason that the Single Tax and its various derivations don’t get much attention in the academic world.

A book about experience with the Single Tax would, of course, be a short one, since we don’t have any  experience of a modern economy in which the only tax is one that collects virtually all the land rent. Rather, this work examines some cases in which land has been taxed at a higher percentage of value than buildings and other improvements.

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Progress & Poverty synopsis

A version of Progress & Poverty with a summary in the margins of (just about) every page has been posted.  Some readers may find this useful. The marginal summary has also been compiled into a 39-page freestanding pdf.

The Secret Life of Real Estate

is subtitled “How it Moves and Why,” but this isn’t about the Kinetic Condos. It’s a response to a questions Georgists often hear: “If you’re so smart, why aren’t you rich?”  Different Georgists give different answers, including “I am rich.”

We know that the major cause of the business cycle is the capitalization and trading of government-protected privilege.  This privilege can be any kind of income obtained without producing, and may flow from spectrum licenses, drilling rights, patents, copyrights, or a hundred other sources.  But the main one is land ownership, since land is not a product of human labour.

When demand increases for a product or service, production can increase, but that isn’t true of privilege. The only limit on the price of privilege is what the market will bear without breaking.   So can’t we measure that price, use the information to forecast economic meltdowns, and thus become wealthy?

Our massive government statistics operations, which know how much more Asian-American households spend on rice than the rest of us do (4 times as much, as of 2003), and that people spend an average of 2.43 hours each weekday watching television, know just about nothing about the price of land.  Only a few countries maintain any such information (Korea, Japan, Denmark, and Australia come to mind).  Many local authorities compile land assessments, but the relationship to actual market prices is, at best, elastic, and the information is not systematically reported.  So indirect and ephemeral indicators must be relied upon.

Moreover, they land price cycle tends to run about 18 years, and may be disrupted by war (not by much else, it appears). This means that taking advantage of it requires a great deal of patience and, one can only say, a certain amount of faith.  And starting at a young enough age, by the way. Of course the cycle might be entirely abolished, but that would require the elites, and some of the non-elites, to surrender significant privilege.

The book is well-written, well-edited, and well-documented. (A subject index would be nice.) Economist Mason Gaffney’s  review is far more informed than anything I could have produced.  He points out a number of imperfections, but on the whole this is a very useful book for anybody who wants to know why many of us aren’t rich, or who would like to be.

Land Value vs. Land Rent

Altho Henry George’s proposal is “to abolish all taxation save that upon land values,” his objective really is to collect land rent for the community.  Of course land value is, ultimately, determined by anticipated land rent, but rent is more stable.

This is illustrated by a recent article in the Wall Street Journal (“Tax Break Divides Large, Small Builders,” Feb 11 ’09).   In an example cited as typical, Pulte Homes is reported to have sold, for $2 million, land they had “originally paid $28 million for.”  So if land value declined by over 92%, how much did land rent decline?

Probably quite a bit less than 92%, because the $28 million was based on Pulte’s guess as to what the future land rent would be.  The actual rent, the amount that someone would have paid to use the land at the time Pulte bought it,  was doubtless much less than their expectation of its future amount.

Some opponents of land value taxation cite cases of great declines in land prices to claim that LVT wouldn’t be a stable source of revenue.  But LVT moderates speculation, and land prices would be more stable if more of the land rent was collected for public use.

One illustration of this is that states where real estate tax is relatively high have experienced more stable prices for homes and lots.

Another Chicago classic now available

Homer Hoyt’s 1933 book “100 Years of Land value in Chicago” is now posted at the Internet Archive. Only a few land value nerds will read it all the way thru, but all should be impressed by the quantity of work Hoyt put into it, describing and analyzing Chicago’s land market for its first century.

Summary graph of land values

Summary graph of land values

This was all done before cheap photocopiers, faxes, and of course computers. I wish someone would update it.